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LEGISLATION
Attorneys-Duty of Profession To Protect
Clients' Funds-Clients' Indemnity Plans
In increasing measure the legal profession has come to recognize
its public responsibilities. One of these responsibilities is to protect
clients from the dishonesty of lawyers. The lawyer who handles funds
of a client is a fiduciary in the highest sense. Occasionally, however,
an attorney misappropriates the funds of his client. The client's
remedy against the lawyer is probably futile, for an embezzler will
generally have no funds to cover the loss. Although misappropriation
is rare1 it receives much publicity when it does occur.2 Embezzlement and loss with consequent publicity impair the reputation of the
entire legal profession.
In dealing with the problem posed, two alternative courses of
action are available. One is directed to prevention, the other to
reimbursement. Three preventive factors have proven most effective.
The first and most important is the personal and professional standard
of honesty. The second is an office practice which removes or reduces
temptations by strict adherence to the principle that a lawyer must
never commingle the funds of the client with his own. 3 The third
is directed to detection and punishment. A method of detection
employed in British Commonwealth countries is a rigid system of
auditing the accounts of lawyers.4 This would be an effective deterrent to a potential embezzler.
1. See Smith, The Client's Security Fund: A Debt of Honor Owed by the Profession,
44 A.B.A.J. 125 (1958).
2. "A very shocking case of embezzlement arose within the last year when an attorney
for the families of a number of persons who were killed in an airplane accident
embezzled the entire proceeds of the settlement which he had negotiated on their
behalf. The defendant airlines had given him a check payable to his order as attorney
for all the plaintiffs and he simply pocketed the proceeds amounting to $250,000.
Widows and orphans were left high and dry. This occurrence . . .was widely publicized in the newspapers .... ." Voorhees, Clients" Security Funds: How They Grcw
in 1962, 49 A.B.A.J. 251, 253 (1963).
3. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs or iTm A-mmucAN BAn AssoClATON 11, states:
"Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into
the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and
should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him."
4. In England periodic auditing is required by legislation. "Every solicitor shall
once in each period of twelve months . . . unless he satisfies the Council that owing
to the circumstances of his case it is unnecessary so to do, deliver to the Society a
certificate signed by an accountant . . . stating . . . the accountant has examined

the books, accounts and documents produced to him and from the information and
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A law office needs a periodic examination of its books by a professional
accountant in the same way and for the same reasons that the affairs of
any other firm will require an audit when it deals with moneys or accounts
belonging to the public. No honest law office would resist or resent a spot
examination of its books unless, perhaps, for the reason that it had recently
had an accountant's audit of its own, in which case a bar-association check
would be unnecessary. An audit of all law offices might be too expensive and
a few spot checks here and there should suffice to preserve rectitude in areas
of the bar where it may be in jeopardy.5

Auditing would spur better law office management generally, a matter
in which lawyers have been notoriously lax, but in which they have
greatly improved in recent years. 6 As for punishment of the guilty
attorney, criminal prosecution and immediate disbarment provide
strong deterrents.
Despite all efforts at prevention, unfortunately, there will be some
instances of embezzlement which raise the question who shall bear
the loss. There is a strong movement to support a system under which
the bar will bear the loss through a fund for the indemnification of
clients. Such a plan has been implemented in several states7 as well
as in several members of the British Commonwealth." The states
which have implemented such plans have not done so by statute but
by voluntary action of the bar associations. Most existing indemnity
plans provide for the establishment of a fund made up of contribuexplanations given to him, that during said accounting period the solicitor or his
firm has complied with any rules made .... ." Solicitors Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2,
c. 27, § 30. This act was almost certainly inspired by the organization of solicitors
itself as the Law Society had earlier required such auditing. See Lund, The Legal
Profession in England and Wales, 35 J. Am. JUn. Soc'y 134 (1952).
5. Voorhees, supranote 2, at 253.
6. See generally A.B.A. Co M. ON EcoNOlIcs OF LAw PtAcnTCE, THE IAwYEr's
HANDBooK 153-224 (1962).

7. "[Alt present 16 bar associations have funds in operation-Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Ohio, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington.
In addition, the following states are in the process of establishing funds-Iowa, Maine,
Minnesota, Oregon, and South Dakota .

. .

. [Sjeveral local bar associations have

also established funds, including Cleveland, Akron, Baltimore, the New York County
Lawyers' Association and the Los Angeles County Bar Association." Committee on
Clients' Security Fund, Report, 88 A.B.A. REP. 427 (1963). For outlines of plans in
nine states, see Voorhees, Clients' Security Fund in 1961: A Progress Report, 47
A.B.A.J. 494, 495 (1961).
8. A clients' security fund is required by statute in England. "A fund, to be known
as 'The Compensation Fund,' shall be maintained . . . . Where it is proved to the
satisfaction of the Council that any person has sustained loss in consequence of dishonesty on the part of any solicitor or any clerk or servant of a solicitor in connection
with that solicitor's practice as a solicitor or in connection with any trust of which
that solicitor is a trustee, then .. .the Society may, if the Council think fit, make a
grant to that person out of the Compensation Fund for the purpose of relieving or
mitigating that loss." Solicitors Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 27, § 32.

1630

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 18

tions by members of the bar association of the state.9 The funds are
administered by the bar associations which receive the claims and
make payments at their discretion. Another indemnity plan adopted
by the bar associations of at least two states ° provides for annual contributions by practicing attorneys for the premium of an insurance
policy under which the insurance company agrees to reimburse the
bar association for payments by the bar association to the victims of
defaulting attorneys. In order that the funds will not be unbearbly
burdened at their inception, most plans provide that no claims will be
recognized that arose prior to the inauguration of the fund." Some
states have set a maximum amount of reimbursement which a defrauded client may receive. 12 If, in any year, a fund is not large
enough to pay all claims in full, the bar association may either make a
pro rata distribution or carry the unsatisfied claims over to the next
year.
Two features of a clients' indemnity plan seem desirable. First, it
should provide uniform protection for clients of all attorneys practicing within the state, and second, it should provide for uniform participation by all practicing attorneys in the state. In states where the
indemnity plans have been adopted by integrated bar associations
(which each practicing attorney is required to join), these criteria
are met as a matter of course. However, these plans have been
adopted in states with non-integrated as well as integrated bar associations, and, of course, adoption by a non-integrated bar which refuses
to recognize the claims of a client of a non-member attorney13 would
result in less than uniform protection of clients. In these states legislation should be enacted whereby the non-member practicing attorneys would be required to contribute to the bar association the amount
assessed each member for the fund, thereby giving uniform protection to the clients of all attorneys of the state and uniform participation by all practicing attorneys. In states where no indemnity plan
has yet been adopted by the bar association, legislation should require all practicing attorneys in the state to contribute an annual
9. For instance in 1961, in Ohio which has a non-integrated bar, each member of
the bar association contributed $1.10 which totaled an appropriation to the fund of
$10,000. Voorhees, supra note 7, at 495.
.10. New Hampshire and Vermont. In Vermont in 1961, the annual premium was
$800 which required an assessment of $2.00 per member of the non-integrated bar.
This insurance was carried by the American Fidelity Company which guaranteed indemnity up to $10,000 for losses caused by one lawyer. Voorhees, supra note 7, at 495.
11. Voorhees, supra note 2, at 251.
12. In Vermont and Washington, the limitation on payments is $10,000 for losses
caused by one lawyer. In Arizona, the limitation on payments is $25,000 per claimant.
Voorhees, supra note 7, at 495.
13. For instance, in Ohio which has a non-integrated bar, payments are limited to
ims against members of the bar association only. Ibid.
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specified sum in order to establish and maintain an indemnity fund.14
The fund could be used for direct disbursements to defrauded clients
or for payment of an insurance premium. The statute should provide
for a regulatory agency which would receive annual assessments from
the attorneys and pay claimants at its discretion.
Some attorneys would be critical of such a statute, asserting that
it requires each attorney to be responsible for the consequences of
embezzlement by other attorneys of his state. However, it is the duty
of the profession, which is given the sole authority to practice law, to
assure the public that there is no danger of loss in permitting funds
to be handled by attorneys intheir capacity as a responsible fiduciary.
Such legislation would relieve possible doubt and hesitancy of a
client about to engage an attorney to transact legal matters involving
the client's funds. As a result, the public would deal with lawyers
more freely, thereby promoting a more harmonious attorney-client
relationship.
The following proposed statutory plan is designed to provide indemnity protection for defrauded clients in states where no indemnification is provided. 15
A fund, to be known as "the Clients' Security Fund," shall be maintained and administered in accordance with the following standards.
(1) The fund shall be held, maintained and administered by a
committee which is to consist of

-

members of the legal profession

appointed for one-year tenures by the Chief Justice of the State Supreme
Court. Vacancies are to be filled by appointment for the remainder
of the one-year term by the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court.
The members of the committee are to elect a chairman from
their number at the first meeting after appointment.
The members of the committee are to receive an annual compensation of

.

_

(2) Each practicing attorney in the State shall be required to pay
annually into the fund an amount to be determined by the committee
not to exceed

_

.

This obligation of the practicing attorney creates a

debt.
(3) Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the committee that
subsequent to the passage of this statute any person has sustained loss
in consequence of dishonesty on the part of any practicing attorney of
this state or any agent of an attorney in connection with that attorney's
practice, the committee may at its discretion make a grant to that person
out of the fund for the purpose of relieving or mitigating that loss.
14. Such contributions have been required by law in England. "Every solicitor shall
on each occasion on which a practicing certificate is issued to him pay to the
Society... a contribution ... of such sum not exceeding ten pounds as the Council
may from time to time determine, and the Society shall pay that contribution into
the fund .... ." Solicitors Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 27, Second Schedule § 2.
15. It is recognized that this statute requires modification to conform to general
statutes of the jurisdiction concerning administrative agencies.
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.
In no instance is a claimant to receive a grant in excess of _
(4) The committee shall have the power to summons witnesses and
subpoena records. The committee is required to give notice. Once a
grant is made, the committee may pursue an action against the attorney
for the amount of the grant paid the defrauded client.
(5) Definitions.
(a) "Member of the legal profession" is any person who holds a
degree in law.
(b) "Practicing attorney" is any person engaged in the active
practice of law.

Conflict of Laws-Desirability of Federal
Legislation in Commercial Aviation
Most commercial aviation is interstate in nature. Air carriers
operate under a peculiar condition, however, in that both the standard
and extent of their liability in tort may change each time they fly

over a state line.' Because of the application of state law of torts,

in one state strict liability may be imposed upon the carrier,2 whereas

in another, the carrier may be liable only if negligent. 3 A presump-

tion of negligence may arise as to the carrier in some states 4 while

res ipsa loquitur may be applicable in other states.8 The extent of
liability may be limited in amount by statute 6 or may be unlimited.
1. "An air traveler from New York may in a flight of a few hours duration pass
through several of those commonwealths. His plane may meet with disaster in a state
he never intended to cross but into which the plane has flown because of bad weather
or other unexpected developments, or an airplane's catastrophic descent may begin
in one state and end in another. The place of injury becomes entirely fortuitous."
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133
(1961).
2. Margosian v. United States Airlines, 127 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1955); Hahn v.
United States Airlines, 127 F. Supp. 950 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); RETATEMENT, Tonrs § 520,
comment b (1939); Vold, Strict Liability for Aircraft Crashes and Federal Landings,
5 HASTINGs L.J. 1 (1953).
3. E.g., Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore, 266 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1059); Lunsford v.
Tucson Aviation Corp., 73 Ariz. 277, 240 P.2d 545 (1952); Jackson v. Stanol, 253 N.C.
291, 16 S.E.2d 816 (1960).
4. E.g., Johnson v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 177 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1949); Kamiensld
App. 340, 53 N.E.2d 131 (1944).
v. Bluebird Air Service, Inc., 321 Ill.
5. E.g., Smith v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp., 76 F. Supp. 940 (D.D.C.
1948); McCarty, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Airline Passenger Litigation, 37 VA. L. REv. 55
(1951).
6. See the situation in Kilberg v. Northeastern Airlines Inc., supra note 1, where the
liability of the air carrier was limited to $10,000 by a Massachusetts statute but
no such limit was imposed under New York law.
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The liability may be determined either by statute7 or by common
law principles. Since the standard and extent of liability are determined by the law applicable to the particular conduct in a certain
jurisdiction, this situation makes necessary choice of law rules that
identify the jurisdiction whose law will be applied.8 The choice of
law rules in the area of torts are in controversyY A substantial ma-

jority of the courts follow the choice of law rule that the law of

the place of injury governs the substantive rights of the parties in a
tort action. 10 Some courts, however, have abandoned this rule and
determined the applicable law by reference to the state having "the

most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties."
The rule under the Federal Tort Claims Act as construed in Richards
v. United States,'2 is that in multistate tort actions the applicable
where the negligence
substantive law is the whole law of the state
3

occurred, including its choice of law rules.'

The public interest demands continued expansion of the air carrier
industry, 14 and uncertainty as to the law by which tort liability will
be determined may be a hindrance to its development. 1 Therefore,
the basic values of certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result

should be present in the law which governs the tort liability of the
air carrier. 16 These values require that a case be treated the same
7. See United States v. Praylow, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 934 (1954) (South Carolina); Prentiss v. National Airlines, 112 F. Supp. 306
(D.N.J. 1953) (New Jersey).

8. See

GOODRICH, CoNFLiCT OF LAWS

172-76 (4th ed. 1964).

9. Id. at 165-67.
10. Ibid. See also Riley v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 889, 215 N.Y.S.2d
295 (1961). But see Rheinstein, The Place of the Wrong, 19 TuL. L. REv. 4 (1944).
11. "Where more than one state has sufficient substantial contact with the activity
in question, the forum state, by analysis of interests possessed by the states involved,
could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of one or another
state having such an interest in the multistate activity." Richards v. United States,
369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962). See dissent of Judge Kaufman in Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131, 146 (2d Cir. 1962), reversed on rehearing, en banc, 309
F.2d 553 (1962); Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 8, at 168; RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
CoNFLicT OF LAws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
12. 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
13. Richards v. United States, supra note 11. See also notes 39-42 infra.
14. Hardman, Aircraft Passenger Accident Law: A Reappraisal, 1961 INs. L.J.
688, 694.
15. Id. at 697. The author points out that since potential liability cannot be determined with any great accuracy insurance premiums must be computed on the basis
of the most unfavorable circumstances.
16. Sweeney, Is Special Aviation Liability Legislation Essential? (pts. 1-2), 19
J. Am L. & Com. 166, 316 (1952). Sweeney's article is a summary of a report he
originally prepared for the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1941. Certainty demands clear,
equal and foreseeable rules of law which enable those who are subject to them to
order their behavior in such a manner as to avoid legal conflict or to make clear
predictions of their chances in litigation. See Neuhaus, Legal Certainty versus Equity
PRoB. 795 (1963). Predictability is, or
in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAw & CoNTFmi.
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regardless of the particular forum in which the suit may be brought."
The choice of law formulas fail to supply these values. 18 If the traditional rule that the law of the place of injury governs is applied,
then the choice of law will depend on the fortuitous place of the
crash and prediction of the standard of liability prior to the crash and
measure of damages which will be imposed is rendered impossible. 19
On the other hand, the choice of law rule based upon the state having
the most significant relationship to the occurrence is so vague that
forum shopping would be encouraged and inconsistent results produced.20 Legislation has been suggested as a solution to the problem.2
Uniform state legislation has been proposed and, in addition,
several arguments have been advanced in support of the use of state
law rather than federal law. It has, for example, been argued that,
liability being a matter of common law and dependent upon local
social policy, the liability of aircraft operators should be left to the
individual state. 22 It has also been suggested that a federal statute
could not constitutionally extend to the liability of aircraft operators
carrying passengers exclusively in intrastate operations.21 It may also
be urged that even if a federal statute could constitutionally extend
to intrastate operations, a state aviation liability statute would nevertheless be sustained as an exercise of the state's police power in the
absence of congressional legislation24 and would not necessarily conconsists of, the ability of persons, at the time they are engaged in activity, to predict
what the legal consequences of that conduct, if litigated, would be held to be. See
Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 3 (1963). Uniformity of result will imply that "when the dominant law attaches certain legal
consequences to an occurrence, these consequences should follow wherever suit is
instituted." Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLrmf. L. Rnv.
959, 969 (1952).
17. See Cheatham & Reese, supra note 16, at 969.
18. See EmmNvzwac, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 223, at 586 (rev. ed. 1962).
19. "But the application of the law of only one state to a particular dispute serves no
federal end other than fulfilling the justifiable expectations of the parties." Note, 74
HARv. L. 11Ev. 1655 (1961). See Rheinstein, supra note 10, at 28-29. The lack of
predictability and certainty to the parties is accentuated by the fortuitous place of the
accident.
20. The possibility of forum shopping leading to inconsistent results is pointed out
in Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, supra note 11, at 145.
21. Nadelmann, Marginal Remarks on the New Trends in American Conflicts Law,
28 LA-w & CoNrxr's. PROB. 860, 865 (1963); Sweeney, supra note 16; Note, 30
N.Y.U.L. 1Ev. 723 (1961); Note, 37 Notre Dame Law. 194, 205 (1961).
22. Sweeney, supra note 16, at 323.
23. ibid.
24. But cf., "So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress ....
Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways.
The scheme of federal regulation may be so persuasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. . . . Or the Act
of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
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stitute an undue burden on interstate commerce if it were a proper
exercise of the police power, since any regulation of interstate commerce would only be incidental5 Under any system of uniform

state laws, however, the questions of conflicts of laws would still be

26
troublesome unless the uniform act was adopted by all of the states.
The National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the
Uniform Aviation Liability Act in 1938.27 The act applied "if such
injuries occurred within this State or if the contract of carriage was
made within this State even if the injuries occurred outside of this
29
State"m and also to property damaged within the state. The act

was withdrawn in 194330 and in 1956 a special committee appointed
by the commissioners, observing that a federal legislative program

might be forthcoming, recommended that a new aeronautical code
be drafted. 31 A statute which is controversial, as any uniform aviation

be, is not likely to be uniformly adopted by
liability statute would
32
all of the states.

federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
25. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 279 (1961), the Court
upheld a state statute saying that, "if Lilly is engaged in intrastate as well as interstate
aspects of the New Jersey drug business, the State can require it to get a certificate of
authority to do business."
26. Sweeney, supra note 16, at 322.
27. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWs AN P OCEEDINGs OF TnE FORTY-EIGH'rs ANNUAL CONFERENCE 68-94
(1938).
28. UNIFORM AvrATON LIABILITY ACT § 301(a), in 9 J. of Am L. & CoM.
726, 731 (1938).
29. UNIFORM AVIATION LLmRHTY AcT § 201(a).
30. HANDBOOK OF =To NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMrISSIONERS 0N UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND P.ROcEE-DxNGs OF T± FnFTr-THrI ANNUAL CONFERENCE 67 (1943).
Also, see discussion pertaining to the act in HANDBooK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMIssiONERs ON UNwoM: STATE LAWS AND Ptoc=mNGs OF THE FxFrv-rmsT
ANNUAL CONFERENCE 114-31 (1941).
31. "Since their preparation the development of aeronautical law, the widespread

construction of airports and the increase in air traffic have brought development which
render the provisions of these original Acts insufficient in many areas to cover the
needs of State legislation....
"The Committee feels that in some of the areas in which states may act to the
extent that the same has not been preempted by the Federal Government, the availability of State Legislation will tend to retard the assumption of additional federal
NATIONAL CoNFERENcE OF CoMIssI NERs ON UNIFORM
authority." HANDBOOK OF =HE
STATE LAws AND Pnocrimics OF T=E SIXTY-FIFTH ANNUAL CoNFERENcE 179-80
(1956).
32. THE UNIroRM AvIATIoN LIArILITY AcT § 301(a) imposed strict liability
on the air carrier. This obviously made the statute controversial and was a contributing factor to its being withdrawn in 1943. See PROssER, TORTS 530-32 (3d ed.
1964). But the difficulties of proof of negligence have bolstered proposals for imposition
of strict liability. See Note, 37 NoRE DAME LAw. 194, 205 (1961). The standard
of liability to which an air carrier should be held, however, is not within the scope
of this discussion. The standard, however, would be an essential feature of any
proposed statute. Several writers have urged that the air carrier should be held strictly
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Because of the interstate character of aviation, the enactment of
a federal act has repeatedly been urged.3 3 The exercise of federal
power would be sustained under the commerce clause,34 and would
no doubt be extended so as to include all aircraft which use any part
of the navigable air space of the United States.3 5 The proponents
of a federal act urge that it would bring uniformity in the standard
of liability, the application of common law principles, the defenses
available and the amounts recoverable. 6
There are two approaches which such an act might take.37 Congress could leave unaffected the state law as to liability and damages
and prescribe the choice of law rule only, the method followed in
the Federal Tort Claims Act. 38 In light of the difficulties encountered
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, however, this approach should
be utilized with caution.3 The act provided for liability "where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred." 40 Three variant interpretations were placed upon this
prescribed choice of law rule before the Supreme Court construed
the provision in Richards v. United States.41 It has been suggested
that the Court's decision was unfortunate. 42 If Congress were to
adopt this approach, three likely alternatives for the choice of law
rule would be the law of the place of injury, the law of the state
liable, but that the amount of its liability should be limited. See Hardman, supra note
14, at 698-700; Sweeney, supra note 16, at 324-35.
33. Hardman, supra note 14, at 697; Nadelmann, supra note 21, at 865; Sweeney,
supra note 16, at 323.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
35. "Air is an element in which to navigate is even more inevitably federalized by
the commerce clause than is navigable water." Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322
U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (concurring opinion). See 1 ScnvWAnz, COMMENTARY ON TiE
CoNsTrrtoN OF THE UNrrED STATES 208-16 (1963).
36. Hardman, supra note 14, at 697.
37. Mishkin, The Variousness of Federal Law, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957).
38. Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
39. See Note, 43 IowA L. REv. 125 (1959), for discussion of the choice of law
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
40. 60 Stat. 843 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
41. Supra note 12. Voytas v. United States, 256 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1958), concluded that the provision directed application of only the internal law of the state
where the act or omission occurred. Landon v. United States, 197 F.2d 128 (2d Cir.
1952), concluded that the court would have to refer to the whole law of the state
where the act or omission occurred. United States v. Marshall, 230 F.2d 183 (9th
Cir. 1956), concluded that the internal law of the place where the negligence had its
operative effect should control.
42. "Thus, suppose that the negligence occurs in State A and the injury in State B,
in which plaintiff resides and brings suit. An individual defendant's liability would be
determined by the internal law of State B. That of the United States would be
determined by the whole law of State A." 61 Micir. L. REv. 181, 183 (1962). See
also 15 VAND.L. REv. 1322 (1962).
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having the "most significant contacts" with the occurrence, and the
law of the state where the contract of carriage was made. 43 Neither
of these three rules alone would produce predictability, certainty,
and uniformity of result. The use of the law of the place of injury
would bring about uniformity of result to the air carrier but produce
neither predictability nor certainty. The application of the law of the
state having the most significant contacts with the occurrence might
generate forum shopping and lead to inconsistent results. Resort
to the law of the state where the contract of carriage was made
would offer predictability and certainty since the air carrier, at the
time he is engaged in the activity, would know the law to be applied
in event of a crash and thus, could predict the legal consequences
of his conduct in the event of litigation. However, as the contracts
of carriage of the passengers for a single flight might have been concluded in several different states, the results of the litigated cases
would not be uniform even as to a single accident, since the various
laws might not create the same legal consequences. The contract of
carriage rule, further, would not cover situations involving damage
to property and injury to persons on the ground, since no contract of
carriage would exist.
Another approach would be a federal substantive law to prescribe
liability, corresponding to the Warsaw Convention of 1929, which
regulates international aviation. 44 The federal substantive law would
displace local policy regarding liability in air carrier accidents, 45 since
under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution 46 the
state law would be supplanted. 47 The Federal Employer's Liability
Act, which provides for liability of the railroad carrier for injuries of
its employees, is an example of the federal substantive law approach
to a similar problem. 4 A federal substantive law governing the liability of interstate air carriers and other aircraft coming within the
federal jurisdiction would eliminate conflict of laws difficulties. 49 A
uniform system of liability would be secured, and the standard of
conduct required of the air carrier would be both predictable and
43. See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra note 1, where plaintiff was unsuccessful in bringing suit based on breach of contract of carriage. The Uniform
Aviation Liability Act provided for the law of the place of contract of carriage as an
alternative choice of law rule. See note 28 supra.
44. The United States, though not a signatory to the Convention, became a party
to it in 1934. See 49 Stat. 3000 (1934).
45. Baxter, supra note 16, at 25.
46. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
47. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict
of Laws, 6 VAm. L. REv. 581, 582 (1953).
48. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
49. Sweeney, supranote 16, at 322.
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certain since one law would occupy the field. Uniformity of result
could therefore be expected.
A federal substantive law is clearly the most feasible method of
dealing with the problems which have been posed. The problem of
what standard of liability such a law should impose on the air carrier
has prompted considerable discussion.50 An extended treatment of
the standard of liability is beyond the scope of the present discussion
but the alternatives merit attention. Basically, the choice is between
liability only if negligent and absolute liability. Difficulty of proof5
and the uncertainty of application of common law defei ses52 are hardships imposed on a party plaintiff if he is required to prove negligence. There is authority, however, for the application of res ipsa
loquitur to airplane crashes. 53 Alternatively, by reasoning that the
burden of loss should be allocated to the enterprise as a cost of
doing business the imposition of absolute liability has been recommended.5 4 Any statute, however, should perhaps make a distinction
between the standard of liability applicable to injured third persons
or their property on the ground and injured passengers who have a
contract with the air carrier.55 Likewise, a limitation on the amount
of recovery might be incorporated in the statute.56 An important
consideration is that the imposition of absolute liability might make
necessary a requirement that the air carrier have accident liability
insurance.5 7 Setting aside the standard of liability required of the
carrier and its ramifications, the basic outlines of a proposed statute
setting forth a federal substantive law would include the following
provisions 58
SECTION

1.

DEFINITION OF TERMs

Air commerce means interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce or
any operation or navigation of aircraft within the limits of any Federal
airway or any operation or navigation or aircraft which directly affects,
50. See, e.g., Hardman, supra note 14; Sweeney, supranote 16, at 168-76, 324-32.
51. Sweeney, supra note 16, at 171-72.
52. Id. at 173.
53. See note 5 supra.
54. Hardman, supranote 14, at 698.
55. See Sweeney, supra note 16, at 324-25. But cf., Orr, Is Aviation Ultra Hazardous,
21 INs. Cousr. J. 48 (1954).
56. See the limitations on recovery in the International Air Transportation Agreement, 49 Stat. 3000, 3019 (1934), to which the United States is a party. Supra note 44.
57. See Hardman, supra note 14, at 699.
58. The outlines have drawn on the Federal Employer's Liability Act, supra note
48, the Uniform Aviation Liability Act, supra note 28, and the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, 72 Stat. 737 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1958). As indicated, only the basic
outlines of a proposed statute are set out. Since the standard of care required of an
air carrier is beyond the scope of this article, supra note 32, the proposed outline
merely points to a method and is not exhaustive.
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or which may endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air
commerce.
Aircraft means any contrivance known or hereafter invented, used,
or designed for navigation of or flight above the surface of the earth.
SECTION

2.

LiABLrrY

Every air carrier while engaged in air commerce shall be liable as
provided in Section 3.
(1) for bodily injuries to passengers of the aircraft being carried
for compensation and for death resulting therefrom.
(2) for bodily injuries, for death resulting therefrom, and for
damages to property caused by the ascent or descent or the
attempt to ascend or the flight of an aircraft, or by the
falling of an object therefrom.
SECTION 3. AMOUNT
SECTION 4.

OF RECOVERY AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.

RIGHT OF

ACTION

FOR WHOM THE BENEFIT OF RE-

COVERY IS GIVEN.
The right of action is given to the person suffering injury or
owner incurring property damage, or in case of death of such
person or owner, to his or her personal representative. In case
of death of the person suffering injury or the owner, the recovery
is for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children
of such person or owner; and if none, then of such next of kin
dependent upon such person or owner.
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Criminal Law-Discovery in Criminal Cases
Whether the modem discovery practices of civil procedure should
be used in criminal cases depends upon whether we view the criminal
trial as primarily an adversary proceeding between the litigants or as a
process for the ascertainment of facts through which justice for both
the state and the accused is hopefully attained within the framework
of the constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights. If the latter is
the true purpose of the trial, then the machinery of discovery can be
useful in clarifying the issues and expediting the trial, as well as
in aiding the preparation of the case which is so necessary in light of
its procedurally adversary nature.
At common law there was no criminal discovery.1 The reasons
traditionally given are: the fear of perjured testimony, intimidation of
witnesses, and tampering with documents by the defendant;2 the
notion that there can be no mutuality of discovery because the defendant is protected by the ffth amendment privilege against selfincrimination; 3 and, lastly, the fear that the defendant already is being
favored in our criminal procedure, and to give him the additional
1. 6 WiGMoRE, EvmErcE § 1859g (3d ed. 1940); 2 WHAYIox, CrIMINAL Evimc.
§ 671 (12th ed. 1955); FLETcmm, PretrialDiscovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN.
L. Bxv. 293 (1960); Louis=L, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?,
49 CALwi. L. Rlv. 56 (1961); Note, Criminal Discuvery-the State of the Law, 6 UTAUx
L. REv. 531 (1959).
2. See, e.g., State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953), in which Chief Justice
Vanderbilt said, "In criminal proceedings long experience has taught the courts that
often discovery will lead not to honest fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury and
the suppression of evidence. Thus the criminal who is aware of the whole case against
him will often procure perjured testimony in order to set up a false defense ...
Another result of full discovery would be that the criminal defendant who is informed
of the names of all of the State's witnesses may take steps to bribe or frighten them
into giving perjured testimony or into absenting themselves so that they are unavailable
to testify. Moreover, many witnesses, if they know that the defendant will have
knowledge of their names prior to trial, will be reluctant to come forward with information during the investigation of the crime.... All these dangers are more inherent in
criminal proceedings where the defendant has much more at stake, often his own life,
than in civil proceedings. The presence of perjury in criminal proceedings today is
extensive despite the efforts of the courts to eradicate it and constitutes a very serious
threat to the administration of criminal justice and thus to the welfare of the country
as a whole . . . . To permit unqualified disclosure of all statements and information
in the hands of the State would go far beyond what is required in civil cases; it would
defeat the very ends of justice." Id. at 210, 98 A.2d at 884.
3. See, e.g., State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 91 N.E. 186 (1910), where the court
said: "The state cannot compel the prisoner at the bar to submit his private papers
or memoranda to the state for use or even examination, for he cannot be required to
testify in the case, nor to furnish evidence against himself. Then, why should the
accused be allowed to rummage through the private papers of the prosecuting attorney?
Neither the sublime teachings of the Golden Rule to which we have been referred,
nor the supposed sense of fair play, can be so perverted as to sanction the demands
allowed in this case." Id. at 424, 91 N.E. at 192.
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advantage of discovery would be to compound the existing imbalance. 4
There is a constant threat of perjury whenever testimonial evidence
is given. Since there is good reason to believe that perjury, or at least
questionable testimony, is somewhat common in civil cases, 5 it seems
inconsistent to allow full discovery in civil cases despite this danger
while denying it in criminal cases because of it. Furthermore, to allow
these fears to impede the use of discovery indicates a lack of confidence in our judicial system, which is not conducive to the administration of justice. The fear of intimidation of witnesses stems from the
practices of an organized criminal element, and while, in a small
number of cases, this might be a genuine consideration, it can largely
be obviated by the incorporation of the "protective order"6 as used in
federal civil procedure into state criminal procedures.
It is said that discovery would prejudice the prosecution because it's
own right of discovery would be limited by the defendant's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It may be asked, however, just how effective the privilege is in deterring discovery by the
prosecution? Despite the lack of formalized rules permitting discovery
the prosecution may easily circumvent this barrier.7 Professor Wigmore has said that the fifth amendment privilege protects evidence
sought to be produced under "testimonial compulsion,"8 and the
general rule is that the defendant's body itself does not come within
the privilege. 9 Thus, blood tests, urine specimens, fingerprints, hand4. The most famous articulation of this idea is that of Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y., 1923), "Under our criminal
procedure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly
to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune
from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the
least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition he should
in advance have the whole evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and make
" Id. at 649.
his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to see ..
5. See, e.g., McClintock, What Happens to Perjurers,24 MINN. L. REv. 727 (1940);
Perrington, The Frequency of Perjury, 8 CoLum. L. REv. 67 (1908); Whitman, A
Proposed Solution to the Problem of Perjury in Our Courts, 59 DicK. L. REv. 127
(1955); The Problem of Successful Perjury, 78 SOL. J. 423 (1934). For an article
criticizing these fears of perjury as being unsubstantial, see Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1134 (1951).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b), which is applicable to depositions, interrogatories, and
discovery of documents, provides in pertinent part: "[U]pon motion seasonably made
by any party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for good cause
shown, the court in which the action is pending may make an order that the deposition
shall not be taken, or that it may be taken only at some designated place . . . or the
court may make any order which justice requires to protect the party or witness from
annoyance, embarrassment or oppression." This would authorize a trial court upon a
proper showing to seal off information or the identity of witnesses.
7. See INBAU & REm, LiE DETEC=TON AND CRIMINAL INTEIMOOATMoN 142-97 (3d ed.
1953).
8. 8 WiGMoRE, EvmENcE § 2263, at 379 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
9. INBAu, SEa-INc1VINAnoN 7 (1950) (collecting authorities).
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writing, and voice recordings 0 may be taken. Although in the federal
courts the prosecution must contend with the Mallory-McNabb
Rule," this protection has not been extended to the defendant in a
state criminal proceeding. Accordingly, the prosecution can make
effective use of interrogation. Furthermore, some courts have held
by his
that where the accused stands mute in the face of accusations
12
the
Finally,
interrogator, this constitutes an admission by silence.
profifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination supposedly
tects the defendant who, for one reason or another, refuses to take the
stand in his behalf. Yet, according to statistics, his13failure to take the
stand is nearly always fatal and conviction results.
The argument that to allow discovery by the defendant would
further compound an already existing imbalance, even in light of the
16
construction given the fourth, 14 fifth,'5 and sixth amendments by

the United States Supreme Court, fails to take into consideration the
numerous advantages of the prosecution. Initially, the prosecution
has at its disposal far more extensive investigative resources than even
the largest private firms specializing in criminal law, and the disparity
is even more pronounced when the crime comes within the jurisdiction
of the federal government because of the vast resources and highly
skilled personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. With the
increasing use of scientific methods of gathering evidence, the defense

10. See INBAU, SE=F-INcmnmtNATnoN (1950); Weintraub, Voice Identification, Writing
Examplars and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10 VAND. L. REv. 485 (1957).
11. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943). FED. R. Cmm. P. 5(a) requires the police to bring the arrested person
before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay" so that he can be advised of his right
to remain silent and to retain counsel. Confessions or admissions obtained from the
accused during this period of "unnecessary delay" and before be has been advised of
his rights, are excluded from evidence at trial.
12. The theory being that an innocent man must be expected to cry out his innocence
in the face of accusation. See, e.g., People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 90-94, 143 N.E. 448,
454-55 (1924); Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 421-24, 32 A.2d 889, 890-91
(1943). The jurisdictions which refuse to accept this theory exclude evidence of
admission by silence either because it is not probative of guilt, or because it in some
measure intrudes upon the privilege against self-incrimination. A collection of cases
on the subject is found in 4 WiGMOrm, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1072. See also Note,
Silence As Incriminationin Federal Courts, 40 MmN. L. Riv. 598 (1956).
13. Based upon data from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
"in 99 per cent . . . of all criminal cases tried in the eighty-six judicial districts at the
federal level, defendants who did not take the stand were convicted by juries." The
plight of the defendant who refuses to take the stand in his own behalf will be
somewhat alleviated by the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which held that the fifth amendment, and
its bearing on the states by reason of the fourteenth amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such
silence is evidence of guilt.
14. Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
16. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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counsel is at a serious disadvantage.'1 The traditional requirement
of giving adequate notice to the accused is being relaxed. The prosecution is being freed from the restrictions of pleading and proof;
indictments are more general in terms, and the courts are paying
mere lip service to the requirement of specificity.' While it is true
that most jurisdictions permit a bill of particulars,19 courts have increasingly refused to grant them. 20 In addition, the prosecution may
amend liberally, both as to form and substance, in order to bring its
pleadings into conformity with the proof.21 In view of these things,
can the prosecution honestly be said to be at a significant disadvantage?
The increasing tendency to allow reasonably expansive pleading
by the prosecution will significantly aggravate the plight of the
accused unless he is given adequate means to prepare for a shift in
theory, both factual and legal. In this connection, it should be noted
that not all "surprise" at trial is readily curable by the granting of a
continuance. 22 It must also be remembered that in the absence of
legislation there is no absolute right to discovery, and most states
have no such legislation.23 The states are free to adopt their own rules
of criminal procedure so long as these rules comply with minimum
requirements of fairness imposed upon the states by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, there is great variation
in local development of discovery of defendant's pre-trial statements
to investigators, 24 and there are a few decisions that have permitted
17. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage In Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE LJ. 1149 (1960).
18. Id. at 1177; Moazr.L m, MoDERN CumNAL PRocEDrmE ch. 15 (1959); Note,
Streamliningthe Indictment, 53 H.nv. L. REv. 122 (1939).
19. E.g., FaD. R. Camn. P. 7(f) authorizes the trial court, in its discretion, to grant
a motion for a bill of particulars.
20. Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77 (1927); United States v. Cohen, 145
F,2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 799 (1945) (denial of a bill of particulars is
"seldom if ever a reversible error"); People v. Sims, 393 Ill. 238, 66 N.E.2d 86 (1946).
21. This is the result of the decision in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935),
which enunciated the doctrine of the "harmless error" so long as the departure from
the allegation had not materially prejudiced the accused in making his defense. Id.
at 82-83.
22. Goldstein, supranote 17, at 1180.
23. See generally Dowling, Pre-Trial Inspection of Prosecution's Evidence by Defendant, 53 Dir. L. oEv. 301 (1949); Fletcher, supra note 1. Orfield, Discovery
and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59 W. VA. L. 1_Ev. 221 (1957).
24. See, e.g., Iii. 11Ev. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-10 (1963), which provides in substance
that upon motion of the defendant before trial the prosecutor must furnish the
defendant a copy of the written confession, and if oral, a list of witnesses to its making.
Failure to comply with defendant's request will result in exclusion from evidence at
the trial. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that this is mandatory upon motion
by the defendant, People v. Dupree, 26 Ill. 2d 320, 186 N.E.2d 237 (1963). Compare
MD. R. Camv. P. 728, which is discretionary with the trial court and is not granted as
a matter of right.
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discovery of defendant's statements in the absence of statutes.2 A
California decision went so far as to permit the defendant to obtain
2
at trial a statement made by a prosecution witness to the police.
However, the fear that the addition of an extensive right of discovery
to the defendant's arsenal might completely weight the odds against
the state has made decisions like this one all too infrequent.
Federal courts continue to bar the door to discovery if the moving
party fails to adequately specify the matter sought to be discovered.
The door is even more securely barred against discovery for the purpose of justifying discovery.27 Discovery in federal courts has been further restricted by the Jencks Act,2 which prohibits pretrial discovery of
statements given by witnesses to government agents, although it does
authorize limited discovery of such statements at the trial. Apart from
the prosecution's discovery by means of the grand jury, there is little
pretrial criminal discovery available in the federal courts.29 Only
if the defense fortuitously knows of specific items discoverable under
rule 1610 or rule 1731 can it invoke discovery. Moreover, there is no
procedure for discovering the names and addresses of witnesses. Since
the Jencks case, 32 the federal courts have been reluctant to exercise
their inherent powers to permit discovery. The trend of recent cases
is against discovery of defendant's confessions z3 and of documents
voluntarily surrendered by third parties,1 even though the United
States Supreme Court has consistently declared that discovery is
35
"the better practice."
The allowance, although limited, of pretrial discovery to the defendant has activated speculation on the possibilities of extending the
formal right of discovery to the prosecution. A number of states
25. See Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957); State v.
Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945); People v. Johnson, 356 Mich. 619, 97
N.W.2d 739 (1959); State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958); State v.
Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 319 (1959).
26. People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956).
27. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958). See the restrictive interpretation put on the Jencks
Act in Palermo v. United States, supra note 27.
29. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228
(1964).
30. FED. R. Cnmm. P. 16.
31. FED. R. CnMm. P. 17.
32. United States v. Jencks, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), had merely held that defense
counsel, at trial, must be given access to prior statements of a witness on the stand
regarding the subject matter of that witness's testimony.
33. E.g., United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
828 (1962); Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, (8th Cir. 1949).
34. E.g., United States v. Hanlin, 29 F.R.D. 481 (W.D. Mo. 1962); United States
v.Brown, 179 F. Supp. 893 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
35. Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 511 (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790,
801 (1952).
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have statutes which require a defendant to specifically plead certain
defenses such as insanity3 6 or alibi,3 7 and to reveal in advance of trial
the names of the witnesses who will be called in support of such
defenses. These statutes have been sustained 38 over the objection
that they violate the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
on the grounds that they do not compel the defendant to reveal or
produce anything that he would not reveal anyway, and that they
merely regulate the procedure by which he presents his case. California, which has been the leader in the field of discovery, has permitted discovery by the prosecutor in the absence of enabling
legislation. In Jones v. Superior Court,39 the California Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Traynor, upheld a portion of a trial
court's order which required the defendant in a rape case to reveal
the names and addresses of witnesses he intended to call, and to
produce before trial reports and X-rays he intended to introduce in
evidence to support his defense of impotence.
Since the prosecution has substantial resources for marshalling
evidence, particularly now with the advantage of scientific aids, the
defendant should have access to evidence that he might not be able
to secure independently. Should the circumstances of a case justify
secrecy, the prosecution remains free to show them. Conversely, if
the defendant can demand pretrial discovery, it is neither consistent
nor reasonable for him to insist on reserving his own surprises for
trial. The courts that have passed on the question have held that
neither the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination nor
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prevents disclosure by the defendant prior to trial. 40 Therefore, he can be required to make that decision before trial if discovery of the prosecution's case is made available.
36. Aiuc. STAT. ANN. § 43-1301 (1947); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1016; COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 39-8-1 (1953); FLA. STAT. § 909.17 (1961); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1701 (1956);
IOWA CODE § 777-18 (1958); Mica. COM1. LAws §§ 768.20-21 (1948); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-22-16 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 6561-62 (1959); WAsH. REV.
§ 10.76.020 (1951); Am. R. Caim. P. 192A (1956).
37. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-1631 to -1633 (1956); IOWA CODE § 777-18 (1958); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62.1341 (1949); MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 768.20-21 (1948); MmN.
STAT. 8 630.14 (1947); N.Y. CODE Cium. PRoc. § 295-1 (1958); OHIO REV. CODE
ANX. § 2945.58 (1958); O--A. STAT. tit. 22, § 585 (1961); S.D. CODE § 34.2801
(1939); UTAH CODE ANN. 77-22-17 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 6561-62 (1958);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 955.07 (1957); A=z. RuIEs Cam. Pnoc. 192B (1956); N.J. RuLas
3:5-9 (1958).
38. See, e.g., People v. Wudarski, 253 Mich. 83, 234 N.W. 157 (1931); People v.
Shulenberg, 279 App. Div. 1115, 112 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1952); State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio
St. 1, 176 N.E. 656 (1931); State v. Kopacka, 261 Wis. 70, 51 N.W.2d 495 (1952).
In the other states they have been accepted without question.
39. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919 (1962).
40. Supra notes 38 & 39.
CODE
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The case method, while it does allow gradual development, is too
haphazard for an area which seems to require defined rules of procedure. 41 Legislation seems preferable because it could define the scope
of discovery available to both the prosecution and defense and establish workable rules to guide the bench and bar alike. While there is
a limited body of case law on the right of defendant's discovery,
there is virtually no authority by which the discovery rights of the
prosecution can be delineated. Thus, any rules laid down will have
to be the result of a legislative policy determination balancing the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination with the need
to obtain evidence, as well as the desire to prevent surprise and secure
mutuality.
Civil discovery rules could be used as a model in the criminal
area, but criminal rules could not be as broad since they would have
to work within the confines of the self-incrimination privilege. Physical and mental examinations have been allowed in criminal cases
and should be continued. Demands for admissions could not be used
because they clearly violate the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Depositions of and interrogatories to the defendant could be limited to questions regarding the names and
addresses of witnesses. Motions for inspection could also be used
with the qualification that the moving party specify the type of
evidence sought to be inspected. Another discovery device that could
be profitably incorporated into a statute is the procedure used in the
state of Washington, 42 which provides for an interchange of witness
lists, and an allowance of amendments to this list. This device,
coupled with the sanction that any witness not on the list will be
excluded from testifying at the trial, unless there is a showing of
good cause, would be an aid to the furtherance of discovery and help
prevent surprise. A statute drafted along these lines should be
accompanied by a proviso denying the use of discovery to either the
prosecution or defendant, except for directly incriminating admissions,
unless the latter waives his special status as an accused. While such
a waiver would render the defendant amenable to inquiry, his status
as a witness at the trial itself would provide protection from incriminating questions. It is submitted that a "waiver" statute is the most
desirable solution since it gives the defendant the choice of either
retaining the full force of the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination or of invoking the full use of discovery machinery. 43
41. The case method is advocated by Professor Fletcher. Fletcher, supra note 1.
42. WA Sr. REv. CoDE § 10.37.030 (1951).

43. Goldstein, supra note 17, at 1198.
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Notice to Interested Parties in Probate Proceedings
Approximately one-third of the states have statutes1 which allow
a will to be probated without requiring that notice be given to the
interested parties. 2 Most of these statutes are patterned after the
ancient probate in common form,3 an ex parte summary-type proceeding which could be initiated immediately after a testator's death by
anyone who produced the will. No notice was required primarily
because interested parties usually received actual notice anyway, 4
and because the early methods of notice were extremely inadequate,
expensive and time consuming. Today, however, there are several
efficient modes of serving notice which are readily available. 5 Also
the need for notice has greatly increased, because in its absence,
interested parties often do not receive knowledge of the death of the
testator or of the probate of the will until it is too late.6 Thus, the
right of interested parties to contest the will or to otherwise guard
their interests is not protected by law in every state, but is subjected
to the contingencies of officious notification by friends, relatives, or
the proponents of the will. Certainly a system which deprives interested parties of this opportunity to contest is unfair to them.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the unfairness of inadequate notice in the case of Mullane v. CentralHanover
Bank & Trust Co.,7 which concerned notice to beneficiaries of a com1. The following fifteen states do not require notice to interested parties: ABK. STAT.
ANN. § 60-208 (1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1304 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. §
113-601 (1959); Ky. REv. STAT. § 394.220 (1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 503 (1957);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 473.047 (1959); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 550:4 (1955); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 3a:3-17 (1951); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-12 (1950); ORE. REV. STAT. ch. 115
(1953); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-253 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. 32-201 (1955);

VA.

CODE ANN. § 64-18 (1950); WAs-.REV. CODE ANN. § 11.20.020 (1963); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 4070 (1961).
2. Interested parties are usually considered to be those persons who would gain
if the will were not probated. This includes heirs at law and beneficiaries under a prior
will.
3. Ams~soN, WmLs § 93 (2d ed. 1953).
4. Sheldon S. Levy aptly explains the situation as follows: "At the time probate
in common form was initiated in England, traveling was a luxury, members of a
family seldom lived more than a few miles apart, and more often, resided together
in the same town or village. A death in the family was almost immediately made
known to all persons who might conceivably have an interest in the testator's will."
Levy, Probate in Common Form in the United States: The Problem of Notice in Probate Proceedings, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 420, 435.
5. The usual methods of notice are publication, registered mail, and personal service.
6. "Today the situation is often quite different. A cross-country airplane or railroad
jaunt is a common occurrence. Families are no longer closely-knit units, but may
instead be dispersed throughout the length and breadth of our nation. Many of our
states could encompass two or three Englands within their borders, and a testator's
death can no longer be considered actual notice to members of his family." Levy,
supra note 4, at 435.
7. 339 U.S. 306 (1949).
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mon trust pool. The court held that notice by publication alone to
known, interested parties does not satisfy due process under the
fourteenth amendment because "it is not reasonably calculated to8
reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand."
While the court has not yet applied this standard to probate notice, it
has been extended to bankruptcy and condemnation proceedings, as
well as to tax lien foreclosures. 9 Presumably, it will include probate
also, if and when the appropriate case arises. One might have
expected that the Mullane holding would have at least stimulated the
interest of state legislatures, and perhaps resulted in a re-evaluation
of their notice-to-heirs statutes. Yet, as evidenced by the few changes
in the statutes since this 1950 decision, this has not been the case.
Apparently, the state legislatures are content to wait for the Supreme
Court to take the next step.
Any statute adopted for the purpose of alleviating the problem of
inadequate notice should fulfill three basic values. Fairness to all
interested parties is certainly the paramount consideration. Second,
the method utilized in the probate procedure must be both practical
and efficient, without being expensive or time consuming. Third, the
interest of society in having a rapid and final settlement should always
be a factor. The latter two values are adequately satisfied by statute
in most states, but the first value is severely minimized in the sixteen
states which have no notice requirements. Hence, the problem
becomes one of retaining an effective means of probating a will,
while incorporating a mechanism which will insure that interested
parties receive notice of all impending probates, and are thereby given
the opportunity to adequately protect their interests. Such a procedure
is needed to satisfy our basic notions of fairness and due process.
Almost all of the authorities in the probate field have agreed that
some system of notice to interested parties should be required. The
principal controversy has stemmed from the various forms which the
procedure should take. After six years of intensive study and research,
the Model Probate Code10 was published in 1946, with contributions
from Lewis M. Simes, Paul E. Basye, R. G. Patton, Thomas E. Atkinson
and others. Undoubtedly the most comprehensive work in the field of
probate law, the Code retains the probate in common form," but
requires that notice be sent to interested parties by publication and
8. Id. at 319.
9. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (condemnation); Walker v.
City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (condemnation); Covey v. Town of Somers,
351 U.S. 141 (1956) (tax lien foreclosure); City of New York v. New York,
N.H.&H. R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1953) (bankruptcy). See Note, 70 HAuv. L. Rv. 1257
(1957); 32 WASH. L. REV. 165 (1957).
10. MODEL PROBATE CODE (Simes 1946).
11. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 68 (Simes 1946).

1965]

LEGISLATION

1649

registered mail or personal service within a short period after the
probate. 12 This allows an immediate probate of the will and the
continuous possession of the assets by the executor, while providing
all interested parties with the opportunity to contest. This method
has been criticized by Sheldon S. Levy, who advocates that probate
in common form be abolished and that notice to interested parties
be required before probate. 3 Mr. Levy contends that this scheme
is followed in two-thirds of our states today.
According to its proponents, the principal advantage of prior
notice is that it provides a single judicial proceeding, 14 where all
interested parties may have their interests represented and the will
may be finally adjudicated. It has the effect of consolidating the
ex parte probate and the will contest, thus, alleviating the need for
a second proceeding. While this method does have merit, it has many
disadvantages. Its greatest defect is that it over emphasizes the
negative. By providing for the single proceeding, it does so at the
expense of a speedy disposition 5 of the probate since the proceeding
must be delayed for weeks, possibly months, until notice is sent and
received, and until a reasonable time has passed, during which the
interested parties may file objections. This sacrifice is accentuated
further by the fact that only a small percentage of wills are ever
contested. 1 6 Therefore, in the great majority of cases, the probate can
be effectively handled without the burden of waiting for all interested
parties to receive notice.
Many state legislatures have refused to recognize the need for
immediate, speedy probate and have provided the means by which a
special administrator may be appointed by the court to administer the
estate in the interim period before probate.'7 They claim that this
permits continuous administration of the estate in the absence of a
permanent executor. This procedure has two failings which are
readily apparent. It requires two accountings, one by the special
administrator and a second by the permanent executor, while the
"subsequent notice system" allows the personal representative to
supervise the estate assets immediately after death and administer
12. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 70 (Simes 1946).

13. Levy, supra note 4.
14. The advocates of the ex parte proceeding with subsequent notice have been
severely criticized due to the "administrative" nature of their method. It is argued that
where the substantive rights of parties are to be affected, the judicial proceeding is
preferred. Lurvey, Appointment of Personal Representatives Without Prior Notice;
Reduction in Number of Appeals and Appealable Orders, 1948 Wis. L. REv. 468.
15. Patton, Improvement of Probate Statutes-The Model Code, 39 IowA L. REv.
446,454 (1954).
16. Niles, Model Probate Code and Monographs on Probate Law: A Review, 45
MicH. L. REv. 321, 327 (1947).
17. Levy, supra note 4, at 432; Lurvey, supra note 14, at 468.
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them through probate with only one accounting at the end of the
final administration. This certainly dispenses with the added expense
and complexity of two accountings. 18 A more significant failing is the
limited ability of a special administrator, who may act only in a
custodial capacity during the interim months.1 9 He cannot actively
invest the assets, make payments to creditors, or generally operate
the estate as effectively as the chosen personal representative of the
deceased who usually has a thorough knowledge of the estate and
the confidence of the heirs. Thus, it would seem that the disadvantages of prior notice clearly outweigh the value of the single
proceeding.
A second argument advanced against the Model Probate Code
method of notice is that in the summary proceeding before notice
has been given, there is always the danger that unscrupulous parties
may gain control of the estate as executors.20 The comment to section
68 of the Model Probate Code, however, points out that this fear is
obviated by the power of the judge, in his discretion, to require notice
prior to the hearing. 21 Moreover, even if an improper person does gain
control, this control will be short-lived because section 70 requires
of the personal reprenotice to interested parties of the appointment
22
sentative as soon as letters are issued.
Another argument presented by the proponents of prior notice is
that the period during which a contest may be brought is "generally
markedly shorter" in the states requiring prior notice than in those
using the common form method.23 If this is indeed true, it certainly
need not be. Each system requires a period for sending notice, a
reasonable period in which interested parties may file their objections,
and a short time for the actual probate proceeding, and although the
order of these events is not the same in the two systems, the total
amount of time in reaching a final decree should be approximately
the same.
A functional problem in requiring notice to interested parties
involves the manner of ascertaining the names and addresses of
all interested parties. The main difficulty stems from the fact that
any potential intestate successor or beneficiary under a prior will, no
18. Professor Atkinson points out that "special administration is always a complication and an expense and has sometimes become a racket." Atkinson, A Model Probate
Code, 79 TRusTs & ESTATES 325-26 (1944).
19. The function of a special administrator is to preserve the estate, and he has no
general power to sell, encumber, lease or distribute property. Annot., 148 A.L.R. 275
(1944).
20. Atkinson, supranote 18, at 327; Levy, supra note 4, at 427.
21. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 68, comment (Simes 1946).
22. MOD.L PNOBATE CODE § 70 (Simes 1946).
23. Levy, supra note 4, at 427.
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matter how remote, may be an interested party, and that up-to-date
addresses are often impossible to find. The most feasible system, which
has been adopted by many of the states as well as the Model Probate
Code,24 is to require the proponents of the will to include in the
petition for probate the names and addresses of all parties who can
creasonably" be ascertained and require notification to each person on
the list. One ancillary problem which has perplexed many legislatures
is the effect on the probate judgment of either the failure of the proponent to notify one of the listed parties or the failure to include a
party on the list that should have been included. If proper notice
is considered a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the probate
court, then defective notice renders the whole proceeding void, thus
necessitating a second probate. 25 This measure certainly deters the
proponents from acting fraudulently or inefficiently, and appears to
be a just remedy for the failure to notify a known interested party
who is mentioned in the petition. However, it is somewhat anomalous
to say that notice is a condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the
court in the situation where notice is not required to be sent until after
the proceeding has terminated. Also, this remedy may work injustice
upon a proponent who has acted carefully, yet failed to include in
the petition the name of an interested party which should have been
included. Perhaps, the best solution in this instance is to say that a
defect of this nature is not jurisdictional and does not void the whole
proceeding, but merely makes it voidable. Then the court in its
discretion may examine the circumstances and the effect of the lack
of notice, and make its determination of each case on the basis of
fairness to the parties involved.
It is proposed that the following statutes be adopted:
MODEL PROBATE CODE

§ 65 Contents of Petitionfor Probate...
A petition for probate of a will.., shall state:
(b) The names, ages and residence addresses of the heirs and devisees,
if any, so far as known or can with reasonable diligence be ascertained....

§ 68 Hearingan PetitionWithout Notice.
Upon filing the petition for probate . . if no demand for notice has been
filed . . . and if such petition is not opposed by any interested person,
the court may, in its discretion, hear it forthwith or at such time and
place as it may direct, without requiring notice.
§ 70 Notice of Appointment of PersonalRepresentative.
In all cases where notice by publication of the hearing on the petition
24. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 65 (Simes 1946).
25. Levy, supra note 4, at 437.
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for probate . . . has not been given, the clerk shall, as soon as general
letters are issued, cause to be published a notice of the appointment of
the personal representative.... A copy of such notice shall also be served
personally or by registered mail on each heir and devisee whose name
and address is known.
PROPOSED STATUTE

FailureTo Give Notice To InterestedParties.
The failure of a proponent of the will to give notice to an interested party
as required in § 70 does not void the probate proceeding but renders
it voidable where the court finds that the substantive rights of a party
who did not receive or have actual notice of such proceeding were adversely affected in the original proceeding.

Tax Consequences of Widow's Allowances
Since the assets of the estate of a decedent are distributed only
when the estate is settled, it is imperative under modem conditions
that the dependent members of the family receive money or the use
of other personalty for their support during the period of administration; thus, every American jurisdiction has legislation designed to
protect the family from economic hardship during this period.' Even
if a sum sufficient for this purpose will exhaust the entire estate, it is
believed that such property can be used more advantageously during2
the period of the family's economic readjustment than at a later time.
Problem
Widow's allowance statutes take many forms. Some statutes give a
fixed sum payable to the widow on the husband's death, 3 while most
direct the probate court to use its sound discretion to set an allowance
which is reasonable considering the circumstances and the decedent's
estate and the family's standard of living.4 Some of the factors con1. 3 Vmu,m, AimucAN FAmY LAWS § 228 (1935).

2. AT=NsoN, Wmrs § 34 (2d ed. 1953). Professor Atkinson cites a case where a
widow was awarded $10,000 per month for eighteen months. Id. at 134. But ef.,
Townsend v. Wood, 342 Mass. 481, 174 N.E.2d 420 (1961), citing Dale v. Hanover
Nat'l Bank, 155 Mass. 141, 29 N.E. 371, 372 (1891), where the court held that the
Massachusetts statute was designed only "'to provide for the necessities of the
widow and minor children for a short time, until they have an opportunity to adjust

to their new situation."'
3. E.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 152-12-16 (1953) ($3500); KAw. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-403 (1949) ($750).
4. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 680; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 178 (1961); OKLA. STAT.
A_NN. tit. 58, § 314 (1951). See Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 687-88 (1964).
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sidered by the courts under the latter type statutes in determining the
amount of the allowance are the value, 5 size,6 "condition,"7 and

solvency8 of the estate, as well as the widow's age, 9 social position or
station in life, 0 and the manner of living to which she has been
accustomed." Some statutes provide for consideration of the widow's
separate means in determining the amount of the allowance which
she is to receive. 12 Some statiites treat all or part of the allowance
as an advancement 3 either under the decedents will or of the statutory
intestate share. The majority grant the allowance entirely out of the
estate before distribution, exempt it from the claims of creditors, and
do not consider such property as part of the probate estate.14 The
duration of allowances varies. They may be for a stated time, 3 for
17
the period of administration 6 or for a combination of the two periods.
A few statutes allow the widow property of a stated amount or cash
in lieu of such property; 8 others allow the surviving spouse to take19
property in lieu of any cash allowance awarded by the probate court;
a few others merely allow sufficient provisions, wearing apparel,
20
furniture, et cetera, to maintain the family for a stated period of time.
Under one "discretion" statute it has been held proper to reduce the
amount of the allowance when partial distribution of estate assets has
caused a change in the relative size of the estate and the amount of
the allowance. 21 Since in most states the allowance payments diminish
5. Bryan v. Quinn, 233 Miss. 366, 102 So. 2d 124 (1958); In re Coon's Estate, 107
Cal. App. 2d 531, 237 P.2d 291 (1951).
6. In re Nolan's Estate, 56 Ariz. 361, 108 P.2d 388 (1940).
7. Baldwin v. Tradesmen's Natl Bank, 147 Conn. 656, 165 A.2d 331 (1960).
8. In re Bundy's Estate, 121 Utah 299, 241 P.2d 462 (1952).
9. In re Estate of Stump, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 570, 185 N.E.2d 334 (P. Ct. 1962); In re
Estate of Clark, 99 Ohio App. 458, 125 N.E.2d 917 (1955).
10. In re Estate of Croke, 155 Ohio St. 434, 99 N.E.2d 483 (1951).
11. In re Estate of Clark, supra note 9.
12. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.36 (1963); NEv. REv. STAT. § 146.030 (1963);
S.D. CODE § 35.1306 (Supp. 1960).
13. E.g., LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 3221 (West 1952) (all); MICH. STAT. ANN. §
27.3178(138) (1962) (any allowance in addition to the first year's); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 560:1 (1955) (all).
14. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.260 (Supp. 1964).
15. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 113-1002 (Supp. 1963) (one year); IND. ANN. STAT. §
6-403 (1953) (one year if the estate is solvent; six months if insolvent); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 633.374 (1964) (12 months).
16. E.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(138) (1962); MnN. STAT. ANN. § 525.15
(Supp. 1964); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 11.52.040 (1963).
17. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.15 (Supp. 1964) (administration period, but not
more than 18 months); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 91-2403 (1947) (until settlement
of estate but not longer than 18 months).
18. E.g., TEX. PEoB. CODE § 273 (1956).
19. E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 474.260 (Supp. 1964).
20. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN, § 731.36 (1964). See Annot., 158 A.L.R. 313 (1945),
for the various types of provisions allowed under statutes of this type.
21. Matter of Guidotti's Estate, 155 Cal. App. 2d 814, 318 P.2d 737 (1957).
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the distributable estate, it has been held proper to terminate allowance
payments and deny further awards if the conduct of the surviving
spouse has caused unjustifiable delay in the closing of the estate.22
This melange of allowance statutes possesses one common objectiveperiod of
to help support the widow and minor children during the
23
adjustment following the death of the deceased spouse.
Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code of 195421 allows a
deduction of up to fifty per cent of the adjusted gross estate for
property which passes from the decedent to the surviving spouse as
beneficial owner. If the estate assets which pass to the surviving
spouse, aside from the widow's allowance granted by the state statute
or state court, are equal to or in excess of the maximum amount
allowed under the marital deduction,25 then no estate tax benefit will
be derived from the qualification of the allowance payments as the
type of property for which a marital deduction is available. But if
the estate assets which pass to the surviving spouse are less than the

maximum amount for which a marital deduction is allowable, then the
estate tax liability will be decreased if the allowance payments are also
deemed to be marital deduction property. The state court's inter22. In re Bundy's Estate, supra note 8 (termination); Orr v. Orr, 89 Ga. App. 633,
80 S.E.2d 489 (1954) (denial of second year's award).
23. See note 1 supraand accompanying text.
24. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056. (BEQUESTS, ETC., TO SURVIVING
SPOUSE.)
"(a) ALLOWANCE OF MABnAL DEDUCnON.-For purposes of the tax imposed by
section 2001, the value of the taxable estate shall, except as limited by subsections (b),
(c), and (d), be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate an
amount equal to the value of any interest in property which passes or has passed from
the decedent to his surviving spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is
included in determining the value of the gross estate.
(b) LMITATION IN THE CASE OF LIFE ESTATE on OTHmR Tmm.NUNABLE INTEnEST.(1) GNERAL Ru. .-Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or
contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing
to the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed under
this section with respect to such interest(A) if an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth) from the decedent to any person
other than such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse); and (B) if by reason
of such passing such person (or his heirs or assigns) may possess or enjoy any part
of such property after such termination or failure of the interest so passing to the
surviving spouse ....
"
25. The purpose of the marital deduction is to equalize the estate tax between
community property and common law property states. Under the community property
concept the wife's ownership of one half of the husband's earnings reduces the size
of his estate. Were it not for the marital deduction the community property states
would enjoy a lower estate tax than the tax in a common law property state where
the wife is bequeathed an equivalent amount. See generally Bow'n. TAX S wINGS
FEDERAL ESTATE
ThRouGH ESTATE PLANNING 14-28 (1963); LoWNDES & KAmRAE,
AND Gi=T TAXES 368-74 (2d ed. 1962); Mahon, The Widow's Allowance and the
Federal Tax Laws, 41 TAxEs 693 (1963).
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pretation of the vested nature of allowance awards received under
its statute is determinative of the treatment given the payments
under the federal estate tax. The varied interpretations of these
statutes enable some to qualify as marital deduction property and
decrease the size of the taxable estate, while others appear to be nonqualified property interests which pass from the decedent.
Treatment Underthe InternalRevenue Code
Section 812(b) (5) of the 1939 Code2 6 recognized the various forms
of allowance statutes and treated any amounts paid under state law
for the support of the surviving spouse as a cost of administration
which was properly deductible from the decedents taxable estate.
Deduction was allowed for amounts "reasonably required and actually
expended during administration." However, it became apparent that
such treatment discriminated in favor of estates located in jurisdictions
which authorized liberal allowance payments, and this section was
repealed in 1950.
H.R. 8300, which was to become the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, had a specific provision dealing with allowance payments and
the marital deduction. Section 2056(b) (7)'8 allowed any payments

received under state law within one year after the death of the deceased spouse to be included as marital deduction property. The requirement that property "pass" from the decedent and the terminal
interest rule created no problem; payments were to "be considered as
passing to the surviving spouse" and not passing to any other person.
The Senate objected to this section. The committee report stated:
Under present law many widows' allowances qualify for the marital deduction without regard to the time of payments. It is believed that the House
bill might raise some question as to the treatment under the marital deduc26. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 812, 53 Stat. 123, provides in relevant part,
"For the purpose of the [estate] tax the value of the net estate shall be determined,
in the case of a citizen or resident of the United States by deducting from the value
of the gross estate-(b) ExPENSEs, LOSSES, INnDEBTENESs, AN TAXEs.-Such amounts(5) reasonably required and actually expended for the support during the settlement
of the estate of those dependent upon the decedent, as are allowed by laws of the
jurisdiction... under which the estate is being administered.
27. S.REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1950).
28. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2056(b)(7) (1954) (deleted in Senate),
provides in relevant part, "(7) ALr.ow.xc. For SUPPORT OF SPousE.-In the case of
an allowance under the laws of the jurisdiction under which the estate is being
administered for the support of the spouse during the settlement of the estate, any
amounts paid to such spouse within 1 year after the date of the decedents death-(A)
shall, for purposes of subsection (a), be considered as passing to the surviving spouse,
and (B) shall not, for purposes of paragraph (1), be considered as passing to any
person other than the surviving spouse."
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tion of these widows' allowances
to the extent not received within 1 year
29
of the decedents death.

While this section would have limited the deduction in some situations,
the results under the 1954 Code without it have not been favorable.
Indeed, if discrimination motivated the repeal of section 812(b) (5),
the provision of section 2056(b) (7) would have further alleviated the
problem by disqualifying those allowance payments in jurisdictions
which authorized liberal awards which were not received within one
year of the decedents death. The Senate, however, chose to allow all
qualifying payments no matter when received.
Treatment under the 1954 Code, without the section dealing specifically with allowance payments, has already been discussed.2 0 In the
first case under the 1954 Code which challenged the deductibility of
allowance payments, Estate of Rensenhouse v. Commissioner,31 the
Internal Revenue Service questioned whether a widow's allowance was
an interest in property "passing from the decedent." During appeal
the Service changed its mind and since then has consistently conceded this issue with one exception.32 The subsequent litigation has
centered about the question of whether these allowances are terminable interests. Jackson v. United States33 apparently narrowed the types
of allowances which qualify for the marital deduction. The underlying
premise of this decision is that a definite interest in property must
pass to the surviving spouse upon death of the decedent. 4 An interest
which qualifies for the marital deduction is apparently created if the
allowance statute grants the surviving spouse a definite amount of
property upon the death of the decedent. 3 However, there is no
identifiable property interest at the moment of death if there is a
possibility that the surviving spouse might lose the status upon which
the award depends, or if the state court has discretion to deny an
29. S. RE. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1954).
30. See text accompanying notes 24 &25 supra.
31. 27 T.C. 106 (1956), remanded per curiam, 252 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1958), on
remand 31 T.C. 818 (1959), acq., 1959-I Cum. BuLL. 5.
32. In Estate of Denman v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 361 (1959), aff'd per curtam 287
F.2d 725 (1961). There was insufficient personalty in the estate to pay the widow her
allowance. The widow advanced the estate money with which to pay the award
and the estate then claimed a marital deduction for repaying it to her. It was held
that the allowance did not "pass from the decedent."
33. 376 U.S. 503 (1964).
34. "[I]n determining whether an interest in property is a terminable interest and
whether the conditions of clauses . . . [(a)] and . . . [(b)] are met, the situation
must be viewed as at the date of the decedents death . . ." S. RLP. No. 1013, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1948). In the Jackson decision the court said: "The premise
... is that an interest passing to a widow is normally to be judged as of the time of
the testator's death rather than at a later time when the condition imposed may be
satisfied ....
" Supra note 33, at 509.
35. E.g., K&. GEN. STAT. ANx. § 59-403 (1949).
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award or modify one which it has granted. 36 The Supreme Court's
approval 37 of Estate of Cunha v. Commissioner,m which held that the
mere right to receive a widow's allowance is not an interest in
property, also supports this reasoning. An allowance which is granted
only for the period of widowhood is also a terminable interest because
the amount of property passing to the widow is not determinable at
the decedent's death if death or remarriage terminates the right to
subsequent payments. 39
The purpose of section 2056 is to equalize the community property
and the common law property states.40 This is accomplished by allowing property passing between spouses to be taxed at the death of the
surviving spouse rather than at the decease of each, with the
terminable interest rule invalidating awards which would not be
included in the survivor's estate. 41 Once received, allowance payments, like property which qualifies for the marital deduction, are
the absolute property of the widow and become part of her estate if
not consumed. Thus, property received under an allowance statute
which does not qualify for the deduction under the Jackson decision
is being taxed twice, a result inconsistent with the purpose of section
2056 and the intent of Congress regarding the treatment of property
received under local allowance statutes. Although abolition of section
812(b) (5) was an attempt to end discrimination, the present interpretation of section 2056 apparently creates discrimination in a different form.
It is evident from section 812(b)(5),.4 section 20564 and the
4
Senate Committee report which disapproved section 2056(b) (7), 5
that the form of the widow's allowance is considered a matter of
state policy. No attempt has been made to force a particular type
of statute upon the states. While judicial interpretation of section
2056 has exerted a subtle influence upon the form of allowance
statutes, only a few states have positively taken steps to qualify
36. See Annot., 144 A.L.R. 270 (1943); Comment, 50 A.B.A.J. 774 (1964); Note,
36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1188, 1198 n.73 (1961); 20 U. CINc. L. REv. 134 (1951); 20 WAsH.
L. REv. 231 (1945).
37. Supra note 33.
38. 279 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1960).
39. For guidelines in determining whether a terminable interest is created by the
state's widow allowance, see CASNER, EsTATE PL.AsNmGn 1-2 (Supp. 1964).
40. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
41. Even if an interest is terminable it still may qualify if no other person will enjoy
the property. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1(g). See also Hauser, Recent Estate
and Gift Tax Developments, 51 ILL. B.J. 876, 882-83 (1963).
42. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
43. Supra note 26.
44. Supra note 24.
45. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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awards paid under the statutes for the marital deduction. 46 It is
submitted that if the form of the allowance is to be considered a
matter of state concern, Congress should allow the states to determine
the type of allowance which the widow is to receive and should give
equal treatment to all. It is unjust discrimination to allow the taxable
estates in one jurisdiction to be diminished by the amount of the
allowance and not to allow this in other states. Furthermore, the
litigation involved in adjudicating every type of allowance statute
which either presently exists, or is created by subsequent state legislation, is costly, time consuming and very indefinite in result. The
Internal Revenue Service has reportedly asked for legislation to
paid under
provide for uniform statutory treatment of allowances
47
state law and end such troublesome litigation.
ProposedSolution
give the court some discretion in setting the
Thirty five
amount of allowance which the widow is to receive. Less than ten
grant a specific amount of property. 49 Under some of the "discretion"
states48

46. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-250 (1949), was revised in 1961 to give the court the
power to indefeasibly vest the allowance in the widow and her estate. See Second
National Bank of New Haven v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 446 (D. Conn. 1963),
for a discussion of the Connecticut statute. IowA CODE ANN. § 633.375 (1964),
allows increases only in the amount of the allowance. The comments to this section
indicate that its purpose is to take advantage of the marital deduction.
47. See Hauser, supra note 41.
48. ALAsKA STAT. § 13.30.120 (1962); Aruz. Riw. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-514 to -516
(1956); Ari. STAT. ANN. § 62-2501 (Supp. 1963); CAL. PRon. CODE § 680; CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 45-250 (Supp. 1963); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 113-1002 (Supp. 1963),
113-1004 (1935); HAvA REV. LAws § 317-21 (1955); IDAMO CODE ANN. 8§ 15-501
to -503 (1947); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 178 (1961); IND. ANN. STAT. §8 6-402
(Supp. 1964), 6-403 (1953); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.374 to -.375 (1964); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. cb. 156, § 14 (1954); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 196, §§ 1-8 (1955);
Micn. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(138) (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.15 (Supp. 1964);
Mrss. CODE ANN. § 561 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.260 (Supp. 1964); MoNT.
REv. CODES ANN. §§ 91-2401 to -2403 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-103 (1956);
NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 146.010 to -030 (1963); N.J. REV. STAT. § 3A: 3-24 (Supp. 1964);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-4-1 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-16-10 (1960); Onio REv. CODE
ANN. § 2117.20 (Baldwin 1964); OxxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 314 (1965); OnE. REv. STAT.
§§ 116.005 to -.015 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 33-10-1 to -2, 33-10-4 (1956),
33-10-3 (Supp. 1964); S.D. CODE § 35.1304 (Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-802
(1955); TEx PnoB. CODE § 273 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-8-1 (1953); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 404 (Supp. 1963); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 11.52.040 (1963); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 3.13.15 (1958); Wyo.STAT. ANN. §§ 2-210 to -211 (1957).

49. ALA. CODE tit. 7, §§ 661-69 (1957); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 152-12-16
(1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2307 (Supp. 1964); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §

59-403 (1949); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 337 (1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-15 (Supp.
1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.211 (Supp. 1964); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-1,
34-41 (1962). The "remaining states" have statutes which either grant a fixed sum
plus certain household possessions or grant merely household possessions or other types
of property.
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statutes the terminable interest rule will prevent any part of the
allowance from qualifying as marital deduction property, while,
presumably, allowances paid under the "specific amount" statutes will
qualify. It is' submitted that a provision is necessary in section 2056
to equalize the treatment of allowances paid under state law. The
proposed federal statute should consider that the problem of ascertaining the value of the deceased's estate causes delays in the granting of
the allowance. The probate court may need this figure to use as a
basis of the final award. More often the reason for this delay in
securing the allowance is a deliberate hesitancy to seek any allowance
until it is ascertained that such awards will be advantageously used as
marital deduction property. 50 Whatever the reason for the delay,
cases indicate that it may be more than one year after the death of
the deceased spouse before the court decree is rendered granting the
award. 51 If the proposed statute limits the deduction to amounts
actually received within one year of death, the reasons for the Senate's
objection to section 2056(b) (7)52 become a reality in that payments
which presently qualify may not be included in the marital deduction.
Instead, the following statute, designed to treat all allowances whenever actually received and in whatever amount received equally, is
suggested as an addition to section 2056(b):
(7) Allowance for Support of Spouse.-Any allowance authorized and paid during the period of administration prior to distribution of the estate, under a state statute or a decree of a
state court empowered to make such an award, shall be allowed
as a marital deduction to the amount thereof but not to exceed
[$10,000] 53 provided that the total marital deduction allowed
under this section shall not exceed 50% of the adjusted gross
estate.
50. If the estate tax has already been paid by the time the court grants the allowance
award, the executor of the estate must file for a refund of the tax.
51. E.g., note 33 supra (14 months); note 6 supra (2 years).
52. Note 29 supra and accompanying text.
53. This figure is purely arbitrary. It is submitted that the manner in which an
amount of this type should be calculated would be to make a study of the size of
statutory and court-awarded allowances and arrive at a figure which is reasonable and
which would afford the most uniform treatment. While the size of allowances do
vary considerably, see notes 1-20 supra and accompanying text, it should not be too
difficult to arrive at a just amount.

